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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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United Nations: Soviet UN delegate Fedorenko has responded negatively to Secretary General Thant's first proposals on the organization and financing of UN peacekeeping operations.

Thant's plan provides in essence that if the Security Council is unable to act on a matter of international peace and security, the General Assembly may take up the matter. If a two-thirds majority of the Assembly favors a peacekeeping operation and the Security Council still fails to act, the Assembly can itself begin the operation.

Security Council action would be facilitated by permitting a permanent member which abstains on establishment of a peacekeeping operation to opt out of paying any share of the expense. An operation at General Assembly initiative would presumably be financed on a voluntary basis.

Fedorenko charged that the proposals are not in conformity with the charter and reflect the views of the West. He found particularly objectionable the provision that the General Assembly could start peacekeeping actions if the Security Council were unable on a second try to do so.

Mexico and some other members have objected to the proposal that the permanent Security Council members may opt out of paying for peacekeeping operations, putting a larger burden on the smaller powers to foot the bill.

On the basis of Fedorenko's comments, Thant is now conferring with the Africans and Asians with a view to postponing the 22 April meeting of the Committee of 33 to allow for more consultations and perhaps a try at a second draft of his plan.

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Cyprus: The Greek Cypriots apparently are considering new moves to reduce tension on the island.

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[redacted] President Makarios is contemplating unilateral action in the political, economic, and military sectors to promote a Cyprus solution in line with that envisaged in UN mediator Galo Plaza's report of 30 March. The overall aim would be to create a unitary state with majority rule but with guarantees for the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority. This would not necessarily preclude an ultimate union with Greece.

Makarios is under pressure from the Greek Government to take steps to reduce tension. He is expected to announce some new measures following his trip to Athens, scheduled for sometime after 25 April. These measures have been reported to include lifting economic restrictions on the Turkish Cypriot community, and offering assistance to enable displaced and impoverished Turkish Cypriots to re-establish themselves.

Makarios recognizes that the Turkish Cypriots--at least those in the areas controlled by the leaders of that community--are not likely to react positively to such Greek Cypriot moves at first. He would proceed, however, on the assumption that the Turkish Cypriots living in Greek-controlled areas would respond and, as time passed, so would the others.

To help such a reaction develop, Makarios says he plans to dismantle Greek Cypriot armed outposts in most areas. Greek Cypriot military commander Grivas has not yet agreed to this plan, however, and both Makarios and Athens may have to apply considerable pressure to secure his acquiescence.

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Bulgaria: The US Legation in Sofia now gives considerable credence to reports that a military coup was uncovered and nipped in the bud, presumably between 6 and 11 April.

The alleged plot is now being discussed freely in Sofia, but the details remain cloudy.

Western diplomatic observers in Bulgaria are inclined to label the dissidents as a group of "ex-partisans"--those Communists who remained in Bulgaria to fight the Germans during occupation, as contrasted to those who returned with the Soviet forces. Rumors label this clique as politically "conservative"--opposed to increasingly relaxed economic controls--and "pro-Chinese"--opposed to the policy of restraint in Vietnam--but it is probably primarily of a nationalist bent.

Almost all sources agree that Ivan Todorov-Gorunya, a central committee member and government official, has committed suicide. They also agree that Major General Anev, commandant of the Sofia garrison, was involved, and is missing.

The leadership of party boss Zhivkov has been subjected to opposition primarily from hard-liners.

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NOTES

*Panama: Extremist labor advisers are almost certainly behind the sugar workers' rejection on 15 April of a strike settlement which had been personally engineered by President Robles. There have been persistent efforts by Communists and other opponents of Robles to develop this strike into general public agitation, possibly in hopes of generating violence against the government. Leftist unions which carried out an effective 24-hour general sympathy strike in Panama City on 14 April have called for another on 19 April, and the situation remains tense.

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USSR: Evidence accumulated from the recent Brezhnev-Kosygin trip to Poland suggests that a studied effort was made to emphasize Brezhnev's pre-eminence in the Soviet leadership, both by the Soviets and the Poles. Brezhnev's prominence was stressed when he and Gomulka signed the mutual assistance treaty--a state rather than party document--ahead of their respective heads of government. In addition, the Poles clearly treated Brezhnev as "first among equals," while Kosygin's role was played down in public.

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Cuba-USSR: [Official Soviet trade statistics indicate that Cuban-Soviet trade reached a new high of \$700 million last year, with the value of Cuban imports almost \$120 million over exports. This total figure may include about \$27 million worth of Cuban sugar shipped to the USSR on the Chinese account--China's partial repayment of a Soviet sugar loan in 1961. Cuban-Soviet trade is expected to rise during 1965 to about \$750 million, aided by Moscow's agreement in mid-February to provide about \$170 million worth of goods on credit.]

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